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Naïve Panentheism
Karl Pfeifer
1. In-troduction
What is panentheism? The term »Panentheismus« was coined by Karl Krause 
in 1828,1 reflecting the Greek expression πᾶν ἐν Θεός (pân en Theós), which lit-
erally means »all in God«. It is often said that panentheism stands midway 
between theism and pantheism, melding the transcendence of God from the-
ism with the immanence of God from pantheism. Whereas theism regards God 
as standing independent of the world, pantheism regards God and the world 
as coextensive or identical, and panentheism regards God as containing the 
world; the world is in God, hence God is more than the world (transcendence), 
but God is also present in the world (immanence).
The word »in« is central here and needs to be clarified. It has been claimed 
that various panentheist positions entail different meanings of »in« and Tom 
Oord has been credited with putting together an illustrative list.2 Supposedly, 
the world is »in« God because:
1. that is its literal location
2. God energizes the world
3. God experiences or »prehends« the world (process theology)
4. God ensouls the world
5. God plays with the world (Indic Vedantic traditions)
6. God »enfields« the world (J. Bracken)
7. God gives space to the world (J. Moltmann … zimzum tradition …)
8. God encompasses or contains the world (substantive or locative notion)
9. God binds up the world by giving the divine self to the world
1   Krause 1828: 256. Although Clayton 2010: 183 alleges that Friedrich Schelling prefig-
ured Krause’s 1829 [sic] coinage of the term »Panentheismus« with his use of the phrase 
»Pan+en+theismus« in his Essay on Freedom in 1809, that phrase (with or without the pluses) 
does not appear in the original German text, nor does »Pan+en+theism« (with or without 
the pluses) appear in any of the English translations; cf. Göcke 2013a: n. 5. A possible even 
earlier use by Krause awaits verification: in his foreword to Vorlesungen über das System der 
Philosophie, Krause tells us (pp. v-vi) that his System der Wissenschaft is unaltered (»unverän-
dert dasselbe«) from his teaching lectures of 1803-04 in Jena and that his Entwurf des Systemes 
der Philosophie of 1804 bears witness thereto. For the first study of Krause’s panentheism in 
English, see Göcke 2018.
2   Clayton 2004: 253.
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10. God provides the ground of emergences in, or the emergence of, the world 
[…]
11. God befriends the world […]
12. All things are contained »in Christ« (from the Pauline en Christo)
13. God graces the world […]
I am not convinced. Except for 1 and 8, the »becausal« relata per se seem to 
have nothing to do with the meaning of »in« at issue, and it is not obvious 
that in most of these cases a plausible connection to in-ness cannot be given 
in terms of a longer explanation involving a locative use. Here is how I would 
rate the list:
– Satisfactory becausal relations (i.e. ones that actually involve a recognizably 
straightforward meaning of »in«): 1, 8
– Unsatisfactory becausal relations: 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13
– Maybes: 4, 6, 12
Let us first consider the Unsatisfactories:
2. God energizes the world. By itself, this does not require the world to be in 
God; an analogy: an electronic device may be energized by an external power 
source (e.g. electrical outlet) or an internal power source (e.g. battery); only 
rarely would an electronic device be contained within its power source, if 
at all.
3. God experiences or »prehends« the world. Experiences and prehensions 
are not confined to internals (cf. proprioception) but may be of externals (cf. 
perception).
5. God plays with the world. Prima facie this suggests that God and the world 
are ontologically distinct, inasmuch as playthings are typically external to play-
ers. In the Heliopolitan creation myth, Atum does »play with himself« but that 
does not support a world-in-God interpretation or outcome.
7. God gives space to the world. »Giving space to« or »making space for« 
can be construed as forming an internal space or an external space. However, 
since the central concept of the tzimtzum tradition is contraction (»tzimtzum« 
means »contraction«) for the purpose of making the space in which creation 
of the world can take place, prima facie giving space to the world does not 
seem to put the world into God.
9. God binds up the world by giving the divine self to the world. One can 
bind up something that is either internal or external to oneself, but giving one-
self to the world suggests the world is external.
10. God provides the ground of emergences in, or the emergence of, the 
world […]. God could presumably provide this whether the world is in him 
or not.
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11. God befriends the world; 13. God graces the world. Again these do not 
preclude the world’s being external rather than internal to God.
Now for the Maybes:
4. God ensouls the world. If the »en« of »ensoul« works like the »en« of 
»envelop«, then there is a semantic linkage to »in« that implies the world’s 
being in God. However, if we go with the Oxford English Dictionary’s secondary 
definition of »ensoul« as »to infuse a soul into« then ensouling could be either 
internal or external.
6. God »enfields« the world. Because this claim is associated with Joseph 
Bracken, the notion of enfielding here is one that derives from psychological 
field theory,3 an offshoot of Gestalt psychology. In psychological field theory 
interactions between individuals and environments are central, and the total-
ity of a person’s experiences and needs and all the environmental factors that 
influence the person’s behavior at any time is called a »life space« or »psy-
chological field«. Psychological field theory also uses topological notions in 
describing the various interconnections within the totality. Hence, psychologi-
cal field theory deploys spatial metaphors that might provide an appropriate 
sense of in-ness. However, it is not clear whether Bracken’s take on fields con-
siders God to be coextensive with a field that is all-enfielding or whether the 
field is confined to the world.4
12. All things are contained »in Christ« (from the Pauline en Christo). This 
one strikes me as an outlier, not so much wrong as irrelevant, perhaps using 
»in« in a doxastic sense of participating-in-a-community-of-ideas or of having-
faith-in; or a social sense of being-together-in-fellowship (cf. the salutation 
»Yours in Christ«). To momentarily change gears, rather than implying any-
thing spatial or locative, 12 seems more on the order of what a party faithful 
might tell a comrade: »Everything is contained in Marx.« To be sure, there are 
some biblical passages that are more amenable to a spatial or locative con-
strual than this, although it is noteworthy that the »things« typically referred 
to are the believers in Christ and not the inventory of the world at large. (But 
that may be enough for a clever spin doctor to get started.)
Benedikt Göcke has instructively generalized the problems he sees with 
what I have listed as Unsatisfactories and Maybes with his observation that 
»almost any interpretation of ›in‹ that understands the relation between God 
3   Britannica 2016.
4   Bracken 2000: 7f. says, for example, »in line with this proposal one can postulate that the 
universe or cosmic process is at any given moment an all-encompassing ›structured society‹ 
or structured field of activity for all the actual entities emergent within it.« […] »God shares, 
in other words, a common field of activity with finite actual entities.«
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and everything else as an internal and intimate relation between God and ev-
erything else can also be thought of as an external and intimate relation, and 
vice versa.«5 As is evident from my own assessments, I don’t disagree with that. 
My problem, however, is with regarding a number of Oord’s so-called mean-
ings of »in« as being meanings of »in« in the first place, rather than simply 
being not relevantly qualified tenets of some variant of panentheism. »God 
graces the world« for example says absolutely nothing about in-ness or lack 
thereof, absolutely nothing about characterizing an internal or external rela-
tion. As a tenet of a variant of panentheism, it does not explain the in-ness of 
that variant; rather, what needs to be explained is how that tenet can be under-
stood in terms of the in-ness of that variant of panentheism.
I don’t believe a demarcation of panentheism that abandons the central loc-
ative or spatial characterization suggested by the etymology and the familiar 
diagrams (more on which below) or makes proprietary claims about any other 
properties of God not articulated in such terms is feasible. A clever theist could 
always appropriate such properties in some manner or other, and panentheists 
of different denominations could always find ways to disagree amongst them-
selves about such properties.
A constant across many popular contemporary portrayals of panentheism 
just is a spatial-locative characterization with accompanying diagrams. One 
may be naïve in holding that this constant directly provides us with a view of 
panentheism comme il faut, but that is where I will start and, after some scru-
tiny, grooming, and fattening thereof, abide.6
2. Figuring »In« Out
Let us then consider some diagrams commonly used7 to illustrative the differ-
ences between theism, panentheism, and pantheism:
5   Göcke 2013b: 63.
6   This is somewhat like the naïveté of naïve realism. Or it could be regarded as akin to the 
naïveté of Friedrich Schiller’s naïve poets, who in a childlike way accept what’s given, as 
opposed to the sentimental poets, who place themselves reflectively and self-consciously 
apart, but may also strive for a synthesis (see his 1795-96 Über naive und sentimentalische 
Dichtung). Moreover, Sharpe 1991: 60 discerns a youthful vision of »optimistic panentheism« 
in Schiller’s 1786 Theosophie des Julius. So I might with modest justification be said to be pur-
suing a Naïve and Sentimental Panentheism. 
7   Although the diagrams, being diagrams, are perforce two-dimensional, it is easy enough to 
imagine analogous three-dimensional representations, and there is no reason that the basic 
distinctions being made couldn’t be made in higher dimensional frameworks if need be, 
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Figure 1 represents the fact that in theism, God and the world are different 
substances. The »world« is typically regarded as being the universe, but we 
can expand that conception by allowing other possibilities such as a multi-
verse or the »many-worlds« of that eponymous interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.
Some diagrams for theism also have an arrow connecting God and the 
world to indicate that God interacts with and intervenes in the world. Without 
an appropriate caption or emendation, Figure 1 could just as well be a dia-
gram for the omni-absent God of deism. Let us represent God’s interactive 
interface with the world with a point of contact between the circles, i.e. a 
common »pineal point« on their circumferences, as in Figure 1a:
although visualizations would be more difficult. Moreover, the regions the lines enclose don’t 
have to be regarded as literally being bounded, although they could be, e.g. for the case of a 
finite universe; cf. Borg 1997: 51 n. 2.
Figure 1a 
Figure 1 
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Typical diagrams for panentheism and pantheism are:
The two-dimensional doughnut of Figure 2 shows that the world is contained 
within God and we can consider God’s interface with the world to be repre-
sented by a shared locus of points along the circumference of the inner circle. 
Alternatively, we might just represent the interface by single point of contact 
between the circumferences of the two circles, as in Figure 2a: 
But now an interesting question arises. Aren’t Figures 2 and 2a ambiguous? 
Although the world is represented as being »in« God, there are two possibilities:
Case (i). The world is in God but the world is not a part of God.
Case (ii). The world is in God and the world is a part of God.
To make an analogy: My vermiform appendix is in me and is a part of me. 
However, the cherry pit I accidently swallowed is in me but is not a part of me. 
Based on these considerations, I submit that Figure 2a, Case (i) is tantamount 
to Figure 1a. If the world is not a part of God and we imagine the contact point 
Figure 2 Figure 3 
Figure 2a 
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as a hinge and swing the contained circle outward like a door, we in effect end 
up with Figure 1a. Opening the »door« wouldn’t leave a circular hole in the big 
God circle, because after all if you take something out of God that isn’t a part of 
God, all of God will still be there. Cf: if my appendix is surgically removed, less 
of my body will remain, but if I cough up and spit out the cherry pit, my body 
is still all there. The upshot is that »in« cannot be conceived as mere contain-
ment; panentheism requires parthood, otherwise it collapses into theism.8
So Figure 2a, Case (ii) is the more suitable option. Panentheism requires 
that the in-God-ness of the world be construed not only in a locative or spatial 
but also in a substantive sense.
R.T. Mullins has recently proposed a model of panentheism that embraces 
a spatial-locative reading of »in«.9 Postulating a distinction between absolute 
(or metaphysical10) space and time and physical space and time, Mullins sug-
gests that absolute space and time, but not physical space and time, be con-
strued as attributes of God. »Absolute space and time exist regardless of the 
physical and temporal things that are contained within them« (p. 342). So in 
creating a universe, God creates physical space and time, but physical space 
and time exist in absolute (or metaphysical) space and time, and since abso-
lute (or metaphysical) space and time are attributes of God, the universe is 
»literally in God« (p. 343). Mullins alleges that »Classical theists typically claim 
that God creates space and time and as such space and time are not attributes 
of God. Some neo-classical and open theists affirm that absolute time is a nec-
essary concomitant of God’s being (e.g. Clarke and Swinburne), but they do 
not insist that absolute space and time are divine attributes« (ibid.). If so, he 
alleges, we have a unique claim about panentheism that differentiates it from 
theism.
Mullins adds that his model also demarcates panentheism from panthe-
ism, inasmuch as the panentheist »can maintain that God and the universe 
are distinct substances. God and the universe are not identical. The universe is 
not identical to absolute space and time; rather, the universe exists in absolute 
space and time. In identifying God and the universe, the pantheist is collapsing 
the distinction between absolute/metaphysical and physical space and time« 
(ibid.).
8    Some panentheists are prone to talk of the world as »God’s body«. I would suggest that 
such a conception of the world actually makes more sense for theism. That’s why I re-
ferred earlier to the interface between God and the world in Figure 1a as a »pineal« point.
9    Mullins 2016.
10   Mullins 2016: 343 mentions a distinction sometimes made between metaphysical space 
and time and physical space and time; he suggests that, given this distinction, absolute 
space and time are to be construed as metaphysical space and time.
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His proposal, as Mullins himself admits, does leave unanswered questions. 
One concern might be a seeming equivocation between substance and attri-
bute: God is a substance; the universe is a substance; absolute space and time 
are attributes; physical space and time (equated with the universe or contain-
ing the universe?) and the universe exist in absolute space and time.11 One 
might think absolute space and time are being treated both as substances and 
as attributes. Can a substance be attributed? (Aristotle and Frege say »no«.) 
Can an attribute contain a substance? (Perhaps when it’s really a relation… .) 
Purists will not be happy with such loose talk. And of course, one might also 
wonder, what’s to stop a contrarian theist from defying Mullins and appropri-
ating some of the claims he assigns to panentheists?12
Such concerns notwithstanding, I am sympathetic to Mullins’s proposal, in 
spirit if not entirely in letter, because it could straightforwardly serve as a cap-
tion for Figures 2 and 2a. However, the discussion for those figures also indi-
cates that Mullins’s proposal does not go far enough. It could only serve as a 
necessary condition for differentiating panentheism from theism, since it does 
not distinguish between Cases (i) and (ii). For that, we also need to construe 
the in-ness of panentheism as substantive parthood; God and the universe 
cannot be completely distinct substances.
3. The Dough in the Doughnut13
Having plumped for a spatial-locative characterization of panentheism à la 
Mullins, albeit supplemented with substantive parthood, I will hereinbelow 
flesh it out with some analogies.
11   If the universe necessarily exists, then physical space and time, in addition to absolute 
space and time, could be considered to be attributes of God. Cf: When I have the attribute 
of having an alimentary canal, and the alimentary canal includes an esophageal passage, 
then ipso facto I have the attribute of having an esophageal passage. Similarly, if God has 
the attributes of absolute space and time, and absolute space and time (necessarily) con-
tain physical space and time, then God could also be said to have the attributes of physi-
cal space and time. Moreover, if God can have contingent properties, then the universe 
doesn’t even have to necessarily exist. Theological conceptual frameworks have a lot of 
wiggle room.
12   But I don’t think it would be particularly contrarian for a theist to claim that absolute 
space and time are divine attributes. That no theists apparently have done so seems more 
like inadvertence.
13   A doughnut chart is a variant of the pie chart. Figure 2 isn’t a doughnut chart, not even 
a bad disproportional one (cf. notes 21, 22); like the cartoon character Jessica Rabbit, it’s 
»just drawn that way.«
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We have determined that Case (ii) is the viable option for panentheism. 
Although I made the comparison of panentheism and theism using Figures 1a 
and 2a because the visual analogy was more direct, it should be clear that a 
Case (i) for the Figure 2 doughnut is equally tantamount to theism, despite 
the greater dissimilarity of Figures 1a and 2. To use a baseball metaphor, there 
is a distinction between the infield (the world) and the outfield (God), and 
although they are interrelated in the game of baseball, the infield is not part of 
the outfield.
Speaking of fields, the metaphor of a force field is also apt, and we can take 
some inspiration from Bracken’s notion of »enfielding« (Maybes #6, above) 
without adopting the baggage attached. What sort of force field, then? Let’s 
first consider an ordinary magnet’s magnetic field. Objects can be placed in 
a magnet’s magnetic field, but with many kinds of substance, the field just 
passes through the object without having an effect on it. Witness the primary 
school science demonstration with a magnet under a sheet of paper and some 
iron filings on top. This demonstration could be an analogy for theism: the 
magnet (with attribute of magnetic force) = God, the paper plus iron filings = 
the world; God and the world are discrete substances; God acts upon the world 
and produces some effects in it (the paper is not affected but the iron filings 
are). Although the world is in the magnetic field, it is not a part of it, so the 
magnetic-field analogy is captured by Figure 2 Case (i).
Consider, too, the fields as postulated by general field theories in physics, 
where the physical universe, with its physical attributes of space and time, is it-
self seen as one enormous, possibly infinite physical field, and where ordinary 
physical objects and phenomena are constituted by curvatures, distortions, 
perturbations, or whatnot, of the field. God, on a panentheist conception, is 
naturally not a physical field with physical attributes. But instead, we might 
conceive of him, in parallel fashion, as a spiritual field with Mullins’s suggested 
divine attributes of absolute space and time. Indeed, regarding God as a spiri-
tual field is one way of understanding the biblical assertion that »God is spirit« 
(John 4:24).14 In physics, forces are typically essentially allied to fields (hence 
»fields of force« or »force fields«), so the notion of a spiritual field can also be 
regarded as essentially allied to a notion of a spiritual force.
Let us then entertain a notion of God as an endless spiritual field that con-
tains the world and of which the world is a part. Much like physicists’ talk of 
matter consisting of perturbations in the physical field that constitutes or 
pervades the physical universe, we can think of the physical universe itself 
as a perturbation in the spiritual field that is God. Nor need we think of the 
14   In some versions of the Bible, John 4:24 has »spirit« as a count noun: »God is a spirit«.
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spiritual field as passive; it might be regarded as an intelligent force15 that wills 
its own perturbations, and such willings of perturbations would ipso facto be 
acts of creation. A »point« in the spiritual field might be expanded into a uni-
verse; in other words, God could will a Big Bang within himself. This would be 
akin to the power of materialization sometimes attributed to yogis, with God 
being like unto a super-yogi who can initiate and foster a benign tumor within 
himself.
Inasmuch as these universe-constituting perturbations are within and part 
and parcel of the spiritual field of force, we may also say that the world is ipso 
facto »enfielded« (Maybes #6) by the spiritual field of force, viz. God. (If, al-
ternatively, we were to think of the divine spirit as being more like the local 
magnetic field in a schoolroom science demonstration, i.e. like, insofar as the 
divine spirit merely permeates or passes through the world in the way that a 
magnetic field passes through an object that is within but not a part of the 
magnetic field, then we would default to some form of theism.)
Presumably if the all-pervading spiritual field is a mentating divine person, 
then it can also be regarded as a soul, in which case we might have a soul that 
»ensouls« the world (Maybes #4). However, we might again ask about the role 
of the prefix »en«. Is it like the »en« of »enmired« (»stuck in or covered by 
mire [i.e. mud]«)? That would seem to suggest that what is ensouled is in the 
soul but is not a part of the soul, and that won’t do here since it amounts to the 
situation represented in Figure 1a or Case (i) of Figure 2a. Moreover, it is odd to 
speak of anything that is nonmental as a part of the soul.
Some panentheists (as well as some pantheists) like to think of the world 
as God’s body. But let’s consider souls à la Cartesian dualism for a moment. 
A person with a soul is not at all ensouled in the sense of a soul containing a 
body or even of a body containing a soul. The situation is more like that of a 
person wearing a hat: during life the Cartesian soul accompanies but is not a 
part of the body (and vice versa). Clearly the relationship between the world 
and divine soul or spirit cannot be Cartesian if we are to stick with the spatial-
locative construal of panentheism. If the relationship were Cartesian, it would 
be what is represented by Figure 1a or Case (i) of Figure 2a again.
However, if we think of a soul in its secondary sense of simply being a par-
ticular person, and think of a person as per Strawson’s person theory,16 then 
a human person is something that has both a body and a mind, i.e. an en-
15   The all-pervading and conceivably intelligent force of the new religion of Jediism is often 
described in panentheistic terms. However, Jediism appears to have no tenets about cre-
ation or the modal status of the universe.
16   Strawson 1959: chap. 3.
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tity to which both physical and mental attributes can be ascribed but which is 
itself neither a physical body nor a mind—Strawsonian tripleism,17 as it were. 
Pursuing that analogy, we might think of God as a divine person/soul who has 
both spiritual attributes and physical attributes, the latter by virtue of being 
suitably related to the physical world. However, if that relation, to repeat our 
previously used metaphor, is pineal, then we are again no further ahead. An 
alternative might be to consider »ensouled« to be akin to »enabled«. But that 
merely suggests providing an additional quality rather than consisting in a loc-
ative or spatial relationship. The conclusion I draw at this point is that ensoul-
ing is not helpfully comparable to enfielding after all, and I therefore demote 
ensouling from the Maybes to the Unsatisfactories.
4. Panning for Panpsychism
Returning to the notion of enfielding, we may ask how panpsychism might fig-
ure in an enfielding scheme of things. Presumably if the all-pervading spiritual 
field is a mentating divine person, it would be a tautology that panpsychism 
is true: mentality is everywhere that that divinity is, namely everywhere—
including, by implication, the physical universe. Put another way, this constru-
al of panpsychism would be true of the physical universe, and more besides.
Contemporary panpsychists and their fellow travellers will not likely be 
happy with such supernaturalization of panpsychism. Those folks regard pan-
psychism as a thesis about the physical universe, to wit that fundamental phys-
ical entities have genuine mental states. I myself am not drawn to the idea that 
»there is something that it is like to be a proton« (or whatnot) and therefore 
have no truck with the various panpsychisms that postulate or argue that the 
basic microphysical entities have primitive experiential/phenomenal proper-
ties or consciousness. However, I do think a significant analogy can be drawn 
between microphysical entities and the so-called unconscious mental states 
and processes that underpin or give rise to our conscious mental states and 
processes. There’s a lot going on in the brain and even if unconscious, the fact 
that we often resort to a homuncular intentional stance to make sense of much 
of it is highly suggestive. Moreover, since physical causal-dispositional states 
satisfy various common criteria for intentionality, and dispositional properties 
attend everything physical, we can argue for panintentionalism, considered as 
17   Cf. Martin 1969.
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a diluted variant of panpsychism.18 Physical intentional-dispositional states 
are everywhere and when arranged in complex arrays result in full-fledged in-
tentional states. How do conscious phenomenal states arise? I lean towards 
the view that they consist of or in neurophysiological properties, states, or pro-
cesses of the brain. These can be called emergent, but we need not decide here 
and now whether the emergence is like the weak emergence of water from its 
constituent elements or like the stronger emergence of property dualism.
Again we may ask how the God of panentheism figures in this scenario. 
There are two but not necessarily mutually exclusive possibilities. Given that 
the physical universe is a realm of cause and effect, we can regard the divine 
spirit as sustaining all worldly causal relationships, making the physical causal 
chains and intentional-dispositional configurations that result in mentality 
possible.19 Alternatively, we can opt for some form of occasionalism, whereby 
God intervenes to produce mental states whenever the underlying arrays of 
intentional causal-dispositional states are ripe for it. Moreover, God would ac-
complish either of these by enfielding, in the relevant sense, the world and 
willing the results. So just as causation in the world might be dependent on 
supernatural intentionality and willful causation, mentality in the world might 
likewise be dependent on supernatural intentionality and willful causation.
Thus we have two versions of panpsychism that are compatible with panen-
theism. The first is merely a consequence of God’s all encompassing presence 
as a divine person who consists in a mentating spiritual field; as such, it is 
simply a restatement of an essential attribute of God. The other is a modest 
worldly panintentionalism, which by the grace of God yields conscious men-
tal states at certain levels of complex organization of physical intentional 
causal-dispositional states. However, panintentionalism, as well as the various 
panpsychisms claiming primitive experiential/phenomenal properties or con-
sciousness for the basic microphysical entities, would be an optional add-on as 
regards panentheism. Unlike the situation with pantheism, God is not identi-
cal to the world and therefore panentheism per se does not stand in need of a 
panpsychism that derives mentality from the physical.
18   I have presented these ideas in more detail in Pfeifer 2016. Is my panintentionalism the 
same as David Chalmers’s panprotopsychism? According to Chalmers 2016: 31, »protophe-
nomenal properties are special properties that are not phenomenal… . Panprotopsychism 
is then the view that some fundamental physical entities have protophenomenal proper-
ties.« Since he does not regard mere dispositional properties as appropriately special, the 
answer is »no«.
19   Cf. Copleston 1961: 118-120.
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5. Another Inning
So far we have focused on how the world might be in God. But God himself 
is everywhere, we are told in our catechisms. God is omnipresent and ever-
present. So God is in the world and therefore presumably in each of us as 
well. I have previously suggested that in order to make some talk about God 
intelligible we need to recognize that the word »God« is equivocal between a 
mass-noun sense and a count-noun sense.20 When used with a mass sense, it is 
similar to the term »gold«: parts of gold are themselves gold; in contrast, parts 
of chairs are not themselves chairs. The noun »gold« does not take a plural 
form or an indefinite article (»a«) and so gold per se is not countable, whereas 
»chair« does take a plural form and an indefinite article. So if gold is in a cer-
tain space, then gold itself is also in a part of that space.21
Some English nouns can be employed in both a mass and a count sense. I 
can say »there’s chicken in the fridge«, and since parts of chicken can still be 
chicken we can each have chicken. However, if I say »there’s a chicken in the 
fridge« it doesn’t follow that we can each have »a chicken«. All this is admit-
tedly oversimplification, but the main idea is clear. Mass terms afford a means 
of talking about substances that treats wholes and parts as on a par.
Let us now return to Mullins’s idea of absolute space and time as attributes 
of God. Accordingly, physical space and time (which conjointly is identical 
to and/or contains the universe) is in absolute space and time; moreover, as 
I argued in the discussion of Figure 2a above, in order to distinguish panen-
theism from theism we need to construe this in-ness as substantive parthood. 
But if God is considered in his masslike aspect, we can say as we did for gold, 
that God himself, qua his attribute of absolute space, is in whatever the abso-
lute space encompasses, viz. the physical space and all its contents, parts, and 
constituents.
I used the term »masslike« in the preceding paragraph because I want to 
acknowledge that there would have to be an important difference between 
the use of »God« as a mass noun and ordinary physical mass nouns such as 
»gold«. When we talk of a mass of the substance gold, it occupies space and 
ipso facto subspaces (or parts) of that space. The problem with this picture is 
that although we can say that what a subspace contains is itself gold, we would 
20   Pfeifer 2016: n. 5. Also cf. n. 14 above.
21   Although not in every part of the space; real gold is not infinitely divisible, so at the atomic 
level we will have parts of gold that are not gold. In our physical realm, there may not actu-
ally be anything that is infinitely divisible while retaining its substancehood or identity, 
not even physical space.
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be committed to the consequence that some subspaces will contain more gold 
or less gold than others.22 Clearly this is not the sort of thing we want to say 
about God. When God is omnipresent, he is completely present everywhere, 
not present in varying quantities. So the analogy with mass terms for some 
uses of »God« needs further qualification.
Here are two additional manoeuvres we might make to explain why »God« 
doesn’t entirely behave like »gold«. The first is that we might say that the sub-
stance that is God, whatever it comes to, is a constant throughout both abso-
lute and physical space and time. Even as the speed of light is a constant such 
that two photons moving in opposite directions from a common light source 
would nevertheless move away from each other with a relative velocity of just 
the speed of light and not twice the speed of light, similarly when God is in a 
space (whether absolute or physical), he is fully present in all the subspaces. 
God’s total »there-ness« is a constant that cannot be exceeded or diminished 
by the different spaces in which he is present. The second manoeuvre might be 
simply to say that, unlike gold, God is not subject to the metrics of the spaces 
he is in at all; familiar notions of distance, area, or volume just don’t apply 
to him.
6. Quo Vadimus?
I have attempted herein to present a coherent view of panentheism that es-
chews Pickwickian senses of »in« and aligns itself with, and builds upon, pop-
ular diagrammed portrayals of panentheism. So we began this disquisition by 
going along with the common spatial-locative characterization of panenthe-
ism and paying heed to some typical accompanying diagrams. But apart from 
their role as visual aids, we might also consider what kinds of diagrams these 
are. The two-dimensional circles of planar Euclidean geometry have finite 
and measurable circumferences; such geometric properties are not properties 
of God, nor do they make for the best metaphors or similes for properties of 
God.23 So these visual aids, if taken too literally, inadvertently reflect the op-
posite of what we might wish for in a characterization of God.
22   Methanks Graham Oppy for this reminder.
23   It is not my intention here to belabor the obvious. I merely want to highlight the idea 
that the geometric properties of the diagrams stand metaphorically for certain features 
of God that might be better captured by a more abstract but nevertheless still spatial 
representation.
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Although we may be naturally inclined towards spatial metaphors that are 
inherently geometrical and typically Euclidean, I would like to recommend 
that we prescind from such metaphors and the particular realizations of sub-
stances that they implicate. Rather than the geometrical spatial metaphors, I 
think we should focus on spatiality at the more abstract level of topological 
spaces,24 of which Euclidean and other geometrical spaces are merely special 
cases. From a topological point of view, for example, God could be conceived 
of as (having the attribute of) a non-metrizable space that contains a metric 
or metrizable space, viz. the universe. Or else, God might be associated with a 
so-called pseudometric space, i.e. a space in which the distance between non-
identical points can be zero. Moreover, topological concepts can be combined 
with mereological concepts (ergo »mereotopology«). Some philosophers have 
disparaged the idea that mereology might be used to say anything distinctive 
or interesting about panentheism, but it seems to me that mereology is amena-
ble to many clever axiomatizations and shouldn’t be written off prematurely. 
Indeed, recent mereological work on conceptions of location may be fruitful, 
inasmuch as it addresses such issues germane to the nature of God as whether 
substances can interpenetrate, whether substances can be multilocated, and 
whether an entity can be an extended simple.25 Such topological or mereo-
logical possibilities are not obviously at variance with Mullins’s proposal and 
the additional views I have advanced. They merely represent a turn towards a 
more abstract and exact idiom that could be to our behoof.
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